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ETHOS, PATHOS, AND LOGOS: 
THE BENEFITS OF ARISTOTELIAN RHETORIC  





Rhetoric, or “the faculty of observing in any given case the available 
means of persuasion,”1 is a necessary skill for legal advocates.2 While 
some theorists have argued classical rhetoric in the courtroom has largely 
died off in favor of what some have called an “inferior” brand of 
persuasion,
3
 Aristotle's Rhetoric, as “the earliest authoritative analysis of 
persuasive discourse and argumentative techniques,”4 and the Roman 
treatises that followed
5
 are still applicable to modern day trial procedure 
and would assist trial advocates in most effectively arguing their position 
and, thereby, advocating for their clients. 
In order to support the idea that Aristotelian rhetoric not only should be 
utilized by trial attorneys, but when utilized, would serve both clients and 
society as a whole, I will be examining the effect on and applicability to 
the courtroom of the three modes of proof,
6
 or categories of persuasive 
discourse, that have stemmed from Aristotle’s Rhetoric: ethos (perceived 
persuader credibility), pathos (emotional appeal), and logos (logical 
appeal).
7
 After discussing the applicability of the three modes of proof to 
trial practice, and their implications in terms of trial outcomes,
8
 I will 
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 1. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, Book I, Part II, Paragraph I (Trans. W. Rhys Roberts. Mineola, NY: 
Dover Publications, 2004). 
 2. Mark DeForrest, Introducing Persuasive Legal Argument Via the Letter from a Birmingham 
City Jail, 15 LEGAL WRITING 109, 163 (2009) (“As a constant component of the everyday work of the 
practicing attorney, the ability to use persuasive rhetorical techniques is an essential part of each 
lawyer’s tool kit.”).  
 3. Dan Levitt, Rhetoric—From Socrates to Court TV, 26 LITIGATION 42 (1999). 
 4. Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, 99 DICK L. REV. 85 (Fall 1994).  
 5. Id. 
 6. “Using the same word to connote ‘proof’ and ‘means of persuasion’ may unnerve strict 
positivists, but the unifying conception makes perfect sense in legal discourse where argument 
‘proves’ truth and the ‘truth’ that matters is that which a judge, jury, or other fact-finder accepts as 
persuasive.” Colin Starger, Criminal Law: The DNA of an Argument: A Case Study in Legal Logos, 99 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1045, 1056 (Fall 2009). 
 7. See Levitt, supra note 3. 
 8. I am limiting this analysis to rhetoric’s value at the trial level. I am doing this because 











conclude with the argument that, when used in concert, the utilization of 
the three modes of proof, to the extent the applicable evidentiary and 
procedural rules allow,
9
 is likely to lead to the best possible outcome for 
the persuader as an advocate for his client, as well as the best possible 
outcome for society as a whole in its pursuit of justice. 
II. HISTORY OF RHETORIC 
As the earliest authority on persuasive discourse, Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
laid the foundation for most of the later Roman treatises on the subject.
10
 
These treatises, which were written for the instruction of audience 
members of all classes, not just lawyers or politicians, “systemized legal 
analysis and suggested ways of effectively organizing and presenting 
commonplace arguments.”11 The authors of these treatises, including 
Quintilian and Cicero, utilized Aristotle’s rhetorical analyses in order to 
“divide persuasive discourse, and legal arguments in particular, into three 
categories: logical argument (logos), emotional arguments (pathos), and 
ethical appeal or credibility (ethos).”12 These three categories have since 
been commonly referred to as Aristotle’s three modes of proof. 
The theories surrounding legal discourse have changed over time.
13
 
Greek and Roman theorists’ analyses were “[b]ased on their close 
observations of human nature and on their own considerable experience in 
arguing cases.”14 These historical theorists consistently focused on the 
audience receiving the message, explored the potential for the 
 
 
rhetoric at the appellate level, where juries are completely removed from the process and oral 
arguments, arguably, play a much smaller role as compared to writings, deserves an article of its own. 
For an example of the greater role of written persuasion in appellate work, see Ben Adlin, At Supreme 
Court, Evolution of Oral Arguments Speaks Volumes, The Loyola Law School, Los Angeles Faculty 
Blog: Summary Judgments (Jan. 6, 2014), http://llsblog.lls.edu/faculty/2014/01/as-supreme-court-
evolves-oral-arguments-impact-fades.html (“One can hardly fault Scalia for his focus on the written 
word. His own legal organ operates almost entirely through briefs and opinions, as do virtually all 
appellate courts in the land. In that world, writing counts. Most seasoned appellate practitioners will 
tell you that if an attorney today hasn’t persuaded the judges through writing by the time she steps up 
to the lectern, oral argument is largely window dressing. Amid the turning gears of the appellate 
engine, oral argument is a ‘minor, almost formulaic part,’ said Loyola Law School professor Allan 
Ides, a former Supreme Court clerk. ‘I can tell you, at the Supreme Court level, very, very rarely are 
oral arguments going to make a difference,’ he said. ‘You don’t even in most cases get to make an oral 
argument. You just get grilled.’”). 
 9. See Teneille R. Brown, The Affective Blindness of Evidence Law, 89 DENV. U.L. REV. 47, 93 
(2011). 
 10. Frost, supra note 4, at 85. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 












manipulation of judges and juries, and analyzed the potential of emotional 
arguments and lawyer credibility as fully as “logical, definitional, or 
organizational aspects” of persuasion.15 On the other hand, one could 
argue modern theorists have a far more limited depth and breadth of 
analyses.
16
 Where modern theorists
17
 often base their notions on the 
assumption that a persuader’s audience will be largely rational,18 Aristotle 
conversely recognized that legal audiences would not always have a high 
legal acumen, sound analytical abilities, or a tendency toward fairness.
19
 
Aristotle thus argued that “an audience of untrained thinkers”20 is that 
which persuaders should prepare to face rather than erring on the side of 
treating an audience as if it were fully rational.
21
 
Likely, the rationality and fairness of audiences will most often fall 
somewhere between where Aristotle and modern theorists have placed 
them. However, the acknowledgement that every audience is unique,
22
 and 
the idea that focusing on and catering arguments toward specific audiences 
is important,
23
 support the conclusion that Aristotle and his predecessors’ 
theories on persuasion, despite and perhaps partially because of their age 
and complexity, are still relevant in a courtroom setting. Furthermore, for 
the same reasons, these theories would benefit trial attorneys, their clients, 
and society as a whole, when utilized properly. 
III. RHETORIC IN PRACTICE 
“Revealing how rhetorical knowledge operates in legal practice is 
particularly difficult since legal practice is marked by a vehement denial of 
its rhetorical nature. This denial usually is expressed by an insistent claim 
that legal practice involves only dialectical reasoning about objectively 
determined concepts.”24 I will attempt to demonstrate, with full knowledge 
of this limitation, that the utilization of Aristotle’s three modes of proof, 
 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. The modern theorists mentioned here often fall into the category of those that favor strictly 
logical, rationality-based decisions on the part of juries. See M. Neil Browncarrie Williamsongarrett 
Coyle, The Shared Assumptions of the Jury System and the Market System, 50 St. LOUIS L.J. 425, 467 
(Winter, 2006). 
 18. See id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at Book I, Part II, Paragraph VII. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Frost, supra note 4, at 85.  
 23. Id. This concept has been supported by the trial bar. Id. 
 24. Francis J. Mootz III, Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal Practice and Theory, 6 S. CAL. 
INTERDIS. L.J. 491, 568 (Spring 1998). 











the logical along with the two considered less rational, while catering them 
to a persuader’s audience,25 is possible, still occurs in the courtroom 
setting, and can be a beneficial tool for trial advocates. Furthermore, I will 
argue that the use of these modes is the most effective way to demonstrate 
the validity of one’s claims and come “as near such success [persuasion] 
as the circumstances of each particular case allow.”26  
In order to be in command of Aristotle’s three modes of proof, an 
advocate “must be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to understand human 
character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to understand the 
emotions-that is, to name them and describe them, to know their causes 
and the way in which they are excited.”27 While the value of these skills to 
an orator, politician, or lobbyist may seem obvious, their value, as well as 
their applicability, has been the topic of much debate among theorists 
when applied to persuasion in the courtroom. In the following sections, I 
will detail the different arguments that have been made regarding the 
applicability, viability, and ethics of trial advocates’ use of Aristotle’s 
three modes of proof in a courtroom setting. 
A. Logos—Appeals to Logic 
Logos seems to be the most widely promoted,
28
 accepted, and sought 
after
29
 mode of proof in legal argument. Stemming from the emphasis on 
logical appeals that has saturated the profession, some legal theorists have 
argued that legal rhetoric has transcended classical rhetoric in favor of a 
 
 
 25. “Classical rhetoricians, beginning with Aristotle, constantly remind their readers of the 
importance of remembering their audience.” Frost, supra note 4, at 85. 
 26. ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at Book I, Part I, Paragraph VII. It is notable that Aristotle made 
ultimate persuasion conditional on the circumstance of each case. This lends itself to the argument 
against that of unjust outcomes based on emotional appeals or unfounded persuader credibility. This 
limitation is also in the interest of justice, and therefore society as a whole, as undeserving litigants 
will not be as likely to succeed in unmerited claims or in defending against deserving litigants. See 
Christopher J. Anderson, The Functions of Emotion in Decisionmaking and Decision Avoidance, DO 
EMOTIONS HELP OR HURT DECISIONS? (Roy Baumeister, George Loewenstein & Kathleen Vohs eds., 
forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 23), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=895781. 
 27. ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at Book I, Part II, Paragraph IV. 
 28. See Laurie C. Kadoch, Seduced by Narrative: Persuasion in the Courtroom, 49 DRAKE L. 
REV. 71, 74–75 (2000) (“[O]ur trial system, as it has developed, aspires to promote a rational mode of 
processing information or decision-making. The system is peculiarly interested in the fair imparting of 
facts and is concurrently cognizant of the effect of the mode of telling on rational decision-making.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 29. See Starger, supra note 6, at 1057 (“[A]s doctrine evolves on a specific issue, the individual 
litigants arguing the issue and judges deciding it necessarily change. In this more abstracted discourse 
[that is cases on appeal], over time, particularized appeals to ethos and pathos become less significant. 
As various district and appellate courts moot a particular legal issue, one hopes that logos becomes 












more logical, rationality-based form of discourse.
30
 This form of discourse 
relies on the notion that a litigator’s audience, largely consisting of the 
judge and jury, is one that is “curious, circumspect, overwhelmingly 
attentive to relevant evidentiary factors, and possessed of judgmental 
standards that we would ordinarily associate with good reasoning.”31 In 
response to those who have argued in favor of the existence of this 
profession-based form of discourse, other theorists have argued that the 
debatable fluidity of individuals’ proclivity to act rationally32 and base 
decisions upon rational criteria
33
 depreciates the value of the utilization of 
strictly logical appeals in the courtroom in favor of a more comprehensive 
form of argument in which the emotions and tendency of the judge and 
jury to trust what an advocate is saying are considered.
34
 
Furthermore, the persuasiveness of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s assertion, 
that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience,” 
experience in all of its plasticity and subjective bases, necessitates a hard 
look at the capability of the human race as a whole, as well as jurors, 
judges, and litigators themselves, to utilize logic consistently and similarly 
over time.
35
 While this seems possible to a certain extent based on the 
influence that the reliance on logic and rational decision-making has had 
on trial procedure,
36
 it does not eliminate the need for, or the benefits that 
may be derived from, the use of an attorney’s appeals catered toward the 
other two modes of proof, ethos and pathos.  
 
 
 30. See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545, 
1555–59 (Nov. 1990) (“But if law is, at its core, the practice of rhetoric, the particular rhetoric that 
law embraces is the rhetoric of foundations and logical deductions. And that particular rhetoric is one 
that relies, above all else, upon the denial that it is rhetoric that is being done. Thus, the rhetoric of 
foundationalism is the essence of philosophy and the antithesis of rhetoric.”). 
 31. See Coyle, supra note 17, at 467. 
 32. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded 
for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 83–84 (Nov. 2002) 
(“[A]ffective and developmental changes within individuals can lead to changes in judgment and 
decisionmaking behavior regardless of apparent changes in the situation. Thus, the propensity to act 
rationally varies not only across individuals but also within individuals over time.”); see also CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 4, 7 (1997) (“People’s choices are a function of the 
distinctive social role in which they find themselves, and we may act irrationally or quasi-rationally.”). 
 33. See Coyle, supra note 17, at 467 (“[Social science data] give[s] us a portrayal of human 
decision-makers who are, as Nietzsche famously said, ‘human, all too human.’ Sometimes they are 
attentive to rational criteria; sometimes they are not.”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (Holmes continued: “The felt 
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed 
or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal 
more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.”). 
 36. See Kadoch, supra note 28. 











Though the use of logic by a judge or jury in response to a logical 
appeal by a litigator could be inconsistent and unpredictable,
37
 it does not 
eliminate the persuasive effect logical appeals have on an audience, the 
audience being the judge and jury in a trial context.
38
 This assertion is 
based on the theory that individuals are persuaded by the use of such 
appeals alone.
39
 In other words, regardless of whether a juror ultimately 
utilizes the specific rationality of the litigator’s logical appeal to come to 
his final decision,
40
 the logical appeal will at least positively influence the 




B. Ethos—Appeals of Persuader Credibility 
Aristotle recognized the inherent truth that “[w]e believe good men 
more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the 
question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and 
opinions are divided.”42 Thus, in a case where there is no definite logical 
outcome, or even in the case where there may or may not be such an 
outcome, the audience’s perception of the credibility of the persuader 
plays a key role in whether persuasion is achieved. 
While legal theorists have emphasized the importance and superiority 
of logic and rationality in a courtroom setting,
43
 Aristotle recognized that 
“[i]t is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that 
the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his 
power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called 
the most effective means of persuasion he possesses.”44 It may not be true 
that in a courtroom setting personal goodness trumps all other means of 
persuasion as Aristotle suggests, but his statement at the very least 
 
 
 37. See Mitchell, supra note 32; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 32. 
 38. Steven D. Jamar, Aristotle Teaches Persuasion: The Psychic Connection, 8 SCRIBES J. 
LEGAL WRITING 61, 62 (2001–2002) (“To Aristotle, logical arguments are persuasive not because of 
something inherently true about logic, but rather because the audience values and responds to logical 
arguments. That is, logic is not outside human experience, but of it.”). 
 39. Id. 
 40. In fact, Aristotle recognized the potential for an audience member’s failure, or refusal, to 
utilize logic or the exact knowledge imparted onto them by a persuader in his assertion that “before 
some audiences not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say 
to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people 
whom one cannot instruct.” ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at Book I, Part I, Paragraph VII. 
 41. See Jamar, supra note 38, at 62. 
 42. ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at Book I, Part II, Paragraph III. 
 43. See Kadoch, supra note 28. 












indicates the potential persuasive value in presenting oneself as a credible 
person, be it via the less clearly definable quality of “goodness,” by 
credibility based on preparedness, or by any other means. 
While Aristotle recognized and memorialized the importance of ethos 
in persuasion, “that importance has been further investigated—and 
supported—by modern scholars of rhetoric” and by many legal scholars.45 
Possibly for this reason, persuader credibility, while not touted as being as 
important as logic and rationality in the courtroom,
46
 has not come under 
as much scrutiny as appeals to emotion in trial procedure.
47
 Likely, this is 
also because the inevitability of the influence of attorney credibility is 
widely recognized, even in a trial setting,
48
 whereas the community of 
legal theorists has not yet come to a consensus as to whether the total 
elimination, or support in specific instances, of emotional appeals is 
plausible or even desirable.
49
 Furthermore, credibility assessments on the 
part of the jury within a courtroom setting have been recognized as helpful 
in certain situations to the point that rules have been put into effect to help 
juries determine the credibility of certain types of individuals (e.g., 
witnesses).
50
 Where logic normally reigns, then, credibility assessments 
based on “[e]motion, intuition, and common sense perspectives” are not 
only allowed but encouraged.
51
 
Countless factors can influence how an audience perceives a 
persuader’s credibility.52 A few examples of the types of factors that a 
juror could use to determine the credibility, or weight to be given an 
 
 
 45. See Melissa H. Weresh, Morality, Trust, and Illusion: Ethos as Relationship, 9 J. ALWD 
229, 231 (Fall 2012). 
 46. See Kadoch, supra note 28. 
 47. See, e.g., Peter B. Bayer, Not Interaction but Melding—The “Russian Dressing” Theory of 
Emotions: An Explanation of the Phenomenology of Emotions and Rationality with Suggested Related 
Maxims for Judges and Other Legal Decision Makers, 52 MERCER L. REV. 1033, 1038 (2001).  
 48. THOMAS MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 46, 48 (3d ed. 1992) (supporting 
idea that lawyer credibility plays important role in courtroom persuasion, with those affected being 
both judges and juries, and memorably noting that “[c]redibility is the only thing a lawyer has to 
sell.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Bayer, supra note 47, at 1038. But see, e.g., Kathryn AbramsHila Keren, Who’s 
Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1997 (June 2010). 
 50. See FED. R. EVID. 608 (allowing a witness’s credibility to be attacked so the jury may 
determine the credibility of the witness in order to accord his testimony greater or less weight). 
 51. Brown, supra note 9, at 47 (noting that “only in this function [credibility assessments] do we 
openly accommodate juror frailty, illogical and inaccurate statements, and heated emotional 
processes.”). 
 52. See, e.g., Peter Reilly, Resistance is Not Futile: Harnessing the Power of Counter-Offensive 
Tactics in Legal Persuasion, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1171, 1187 (May 2013). 











attorney’s position, include the rate of his speech;53 his professional status, 
social status, or job title;
54
 the persuader’s “confidence in presentation as 
exhibited through eye contact, body posture and gestures, facial 
expressions, and speaking style (such as tone, volume, speed, and 
accent);”55 the persuader’s intelligence and trustworthiness;56 and the 
persuader’s similarities to the juror in the areas of race, gender, religious 
belief, and socioeconomic status.
57
  
While the attributes listed above consist of “source-characteristic 
attributes,” attorneys also have the avenue of “source-relational 
attributes”58 such as “familiarity, similarity, and attractiveness”59 through 
which to establish credibility with their audience.
60
 These source-relational 
attributes create a bond, termed identification by rhetorical theorist 
Kenneth Burke,
61
 between the persuader and audience. Then, “[w]hen 
source-relational attributes enhance the audience's acceptance of or 
identification with the source, or with the material presented by the source, 
those attributes similarly enhance persuasion.”62 When applying this 
theory to the courtroom setting, this type of identification would lead to a 
greater probability of the audience, a judge and jury, heeding, and 
potentially being persuaded by, an attorney’s arguments. This persuasion 
would most likely be achieved in the event that the attorney managed to 
 
 
 53. See Jansen Voss, The Science of Persuasion: An Exploration of Advocacy and the Science 
Behind the Art of Persuasion in the Courtroom, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 301, 309 (2005) (“Varying 
the speed of one’s speech affects credibility and helps create a temporal framework for events or 
actions. Studies show that “rapid speaking (to a point) tends to increase believability,’ while 
“unnaturally slow speech is [perceived] as an indicator of uncertainty . . . .’” (alterations in original) 
(footnote omitted)). 
 54. Reilly, supra note 52, at 1187. 
 55. Id.; see also Craig Lambert, The Psyche on Automatic: Amy Cuddy Probes Snap Judgments, 
Warm Feelings, and How to Become an “Alpha Dog”, HARV. MAGAZINE, Nov.–Dec. 2010, at 48, 52 
(discussing research by Lakshmi Balachandra that indicates venture-capital pitches are largely based 
on non-verbal cues such as “calmness,” “passion,” “eye contact,” and “lack of awkwardness”). 
 56. See Weresh, supra note 45, at 231 (discussing building of relationships through source-
relational attributes to establish credibility, alongside more typically discussed source-characteristics). 
 57. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 133 (1986). But see ARISTOTLE, 
supra note 1, at Book I, Part II, Paragraph III (claiming “this kind of persuasion [ethos], like the 
others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before 
he begins to speak.”) This clearly goes against the idea that factors such as race and gender, that can be 
perceived before and have nothing to do with a persuader’s presentation, play a role in perceived 
persuader credibility. 
 58. Weresh, supra note 45, at 231. 
 59. Id.; see also HARRY C. TRIANDIS, ATTITUDE AND ATTITUDE CHANGE 168 (1971). 
 60. Weresh, supra note 45, at 231. 
 61. See KENNETH BURKE, A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES 172 (1950). 












form some sort of connection with his audience, be it emotionally or 
otherwise. 
Some of the aforementioned avenues through which a persuader may 
achieve credibility with his audience are not easily accessible to attorneys 
in a courtroom without some deliberate effort. Specifically, an attorney’s 
establishment of familiarity or similarity with his audience, without having 
met the jury members he is attempting to persuade, may be difficult to 
establish, particularly with the preconceived negative perception of 
attorney credibility held by some members of the public.
63
 However, 
perceived familiarity or similarity with jury members could conceivably 
“be achieved by what the speaker says,”64 through his use of familiar, 
colloquial language as opposed to formal, legalistic language, as well as 
with relaxed body language, open and honest facial expressions, and a 
friendly as opposed to lecturing or impersonal tone of voice. If the 
attorney succeeds in creating trust, or a greater perceived similarity, 
familiarity, or liking between him and his audience through any of these or 
other strategies, including displays or appeals to emotion discussed in 
detail below, he will have enhanced his persuasiveness.
65
  
C. Pathos—Appeals to Emotion 
“Our everyday experiences leave little doubt that our emotions can 
influence the decisions we make, much as the outcome of our decisions 
can influence the emotions we experience.”66 Aristotle recognized this 
fact, noting, while introducing the pathos mode of proof, that “persuasion 
may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our 
judgments when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we 
are pained and hostile.”67 While some would argue there is no room for 
emotion in legal decision-making,
68
 it appears evident that, to some extent, 
 
 
 63. Julie A. Oseid, When Big Brother Is Watching [Out for] You: Mentoring Lawyers, Choosing 
a Mentor, and Sharing Ten Virtues from My Mentor, 59 S.C. L. REV. 393, 423 (“Lawyers are 
constantly criticized for their dishonesty, lack of civility, and greed.”). 
 64. ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at Book I, Part II, Paragraph III. 
 65. Weresh, supra note 45, at 234. 
 66. Norbert Schwarz, Emotion, Cognition, and Decision Making, 14 COGNITION & EMOTION 433 
(2000). 
 67. ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at Book I, Part II, Paragraph III. 
 68. See Todd E. Pettys, The Use of Prejudicial Evidence: The Emotional Juror, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1609 (2007). (Many in the legal profession, particularly in the United States, have come to 
believe “emotions undercut rational decision making.”); see also id. at n.6 (“‘While not without the 
occasional notable exception, judicial opinions habitually profess a Platonic-Kantian credo that 
emotions have no legitimate place in legal decision making.’”) (citing Bayer, supra note 47, at 1038). 















On one end, scholars have argued that, in the legal arena, emotion is a 
tool individuals use in analogical reasoning that operates in conjunction 
with logic.
70
 Emotion is thus “what releases the legal imagination to see 
relevant similarities and therefore permits the final leap to judgment.”71 
Completely apart from the connection between emotion and logic is the 
following notion that expands further upon the benefits that may arise 
from the presence of emotions in the courtroom.  
Legal decision-making is enriched and refined by the operation of 
emotions because they direct attention to particular dimensions of a 
case, or shape decisionmakers' ability to understand the perspective 
of, or the stakes of a decision for, a particular party. Efforts to exile 
affective response—a damaging outgrowth of historic 
dichotomizing—can produce legal judgments that are shallow, 
routinized, devaluative, and even irresponsible.
72
 
To rephrase, completely void of the influence of emotion, those engaging 
in legal reasoning are rendered incapable of, or severely handicapped in 
their efforts at placing themselves in the shoes of litigants. Cases in which 
this ability would be advantageous are easy to conceive of as any 
argument in which the reasonableness of the actions of the individual in 
question is implicated would clearly benefit from the individual’s advocate 
being able to convey the emotional state of the individual through the 
advocate’s use of emotional appeal.73 
On the other end of the spectrum, there are those that have argued that 
emotions are not only present in the courtroom, but dispositive in jury 
 
 
 69. Emotions precluding rational decisionmaking altogether is one concern of those in opposition 
of their existence in the courtroom. See id. (certain communications can preclude rational processing 
when they “generate emotions”) (citing Yoav Hammer, Expressions Which Preclude Rational 
Processing: The Case for Regulating Non-informational Advertisements, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 435, 
459–60 (2005)). 
 70. See Jonathan Uffelman, Hamlet Was a Law Student: A “Dramatic” Look at Emotion’s Effect 
on Analogical Reasoning, 96 GEO. L.J. 1725, 1728 (June 2008). 
 71. Id. at 1728–29. 
 72. Keren, supra note 49.  
 73. Claiming self-defense in Missouri, or the use of force in defense of persons, requires a jury to 
determine whether the person asserting it “reasonably believe[d] such force to be necessary to defend 
himself . . . from what he . . . reasonably believe[d] to be the use or imminent use of unlawful force by 
such other person[.]” MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.031 (Lexis) (emphasis added). This is an example in 
which the ability to identify with the person asserting the defense through emotion, in order to 












trials to the detriment of justice.
74
 In recognizing the potential for such a 
result, and to guard against the inappropriate use of emotions to 
manipulate juries,
75
 safeguards have been inserted into the rules 
surrounding litigation.
76
 For example, Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, which authorizes a trial court to exclude relevant evidence if its 
“probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of . . . unfair 
prejudice,”77 unfairly prejudicial evidence being that which has “an undue 
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not 
necessarily, an emotional one,”78 is such a safeguard.79 Alongside the 
federal rules, “states have responded differently to the question of how far 
counsel can go to appeal to the jurors' emotions. Attorneys are often 
permitted to display some aspects of emotion during their closing 
arguments, but they are ‘not permitted to appeal to the emotions and 
prejudices of the jurors.’”80 
Attempting to limit the influence attorneys have on the emotional state 
of jurors with rules is not likely to prevent such an inevitability. Emotions 
can be influenced by countless stimuli, including the previously mentioned 
use of emotions by attorneys
81
 and the all-but-uncontrollable preexisting 
mood of the jurors themselves.
82
 Instead of fighting emotions altogether, 
 
 
 74. Emotional reactions from juries have been blamed for unwarranted damage awards as well as 
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REV. 53, 57 (2001); see also Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 537, 593 (2005).  
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 77. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 78. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note (emphasis added). 
 79. “In the evidentiary setting in particular, the legal community needs to move beyond the 
notion that all emotional influences automatically fall on the “unfair prejudice” side of the balance that 
Rule 403 prescribes for testing the relative weight of the evidence’s probative value and potential for 
unfair prejudice.” Pettys, supra note 15, at 1613. 
 80. Brown, supra note 9. 
 81. See, e.g., Reilly, supra note 52, at 1171 (discussing perceived persuader mood as having 
effect on emotions of those being persuaded); see also Pillsbury, supra note 76 (discussing influence 
emotions have on jurors in context of sentencing and prevalence and inevitability of role of emotions 
during sentencing in which the death penalty is possible). 
 82. See ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 112 (George A. Kennedy 
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2007) (“Things do not seem the same to those who are friendly and 
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“[t]he questions we ought to be asking . . . [are] which emotions are 
helpful or harmful and in which contexts they play that role. . . . [And] in 
evaluating emotions, we need to consider how they structure the 
perception of decisions to be made at the outset, and how they can 
influence both toward action and inhibition.”83 These questions deserve 
further research, as the ostracization of emotions altogether from the 
courtroom is not realistic. Thus, it would be ideal to have a more well-
defined limitation on attorney appeals to emotion in order to guard against 
manipulation and other potential injustices. 
Pending a determination on those questions, the persuasiveness of the 
suggested connection between emotion and “reasonable (adaptive and 
desirable) outcomes” as well as rational decision-making lends itself to a 
determination that emotion is not per se a negative presence in the 
courtroom.
84
 On the contrary, when appeals to emotion are utilized in 
conjunction with the expected and more widely appreciated appeals to 
logic and the inherent and unavoidable persuasion based on perceived 
persuader credibility, a more complete argument is possible. In this 
respect, the litigator’s argument will not suffer from the absence of an 
otherwise beneficial and compelling mode of proof at trial.
85
 
D. An Illustration of the Utilization of the Three Modes in a Courtroom  
Some may argue that the conscious redirection of a seasoned or a fresh-
off-the-Bar attorney’s litigation style would not be worth the effort it 
would require. An argument against that, however, is that while it is true 
that the effective utilization of Aristotle’s three modes of proof in a 
courtroom setting may require conscious effort on the part of the advocate, 
trial advocacy requires conscious effort even when specific persuasive 
techniques are not being used or experience is the only “edge” being relied 
on. As Caldwell, Perrin, Gabriel, and Gross noted:  
In the courtroom, the advocate must inform and persuade; he must 
respect the cumbersome rules of the court but still present the facts 
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CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1151 (2005) (“Results from psychology and affective neuroscience suggest that, in 
the final analysis, emotional considerations may be essential for attaining reasonable (adaptive and 
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in a memorable and compelling way. That is, the advocate's 
message must be accurate, factual, and legally adequate, but also 
absorbing, captivating, and emotionally forceful. Similarly, the 
advocate, as messenger, must not only be lawyerly, making sure 
that all the “i’s” are dotted and “t’s” are crossed, but also credible 




Thus, instead of refusing a change because formerly used strategies served 
well enough or had become accepted as the “‘right’ way to try a case” at a 
particular firm
87
 out of a desire to adhere to the “old dog new tricks” 
mentality, even a seasoned trial advocate could be more persuasive 
through the use of Aristotelian rhetoric, while still taking advantage of his 
experience by using it to reign in these new persuasive techniques so as to 
comply with the applicable rules.
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Within the following passages, I will place into narrative various 
common scenes in a courtroom setting. Within these scenes, I will 
illustrate what the effective use of Aristotle’s three modes of proof may 
look like. I will also provide comparisons of this to a courtroom setting in 
which Aristotle’s theories are ignored in favor of the aforementioned 
“lesser” form of persuasion in which one or all of the modes are not used 
to their fullest potential.  
1. Opening Statements 
Dressed in a dark blue suit, topped off with a conservative blue and 
gold tie, the persuader steps up to the podium. The judge sees a 
professional, dressed appropriately for the courtroom. The jury sees an 
attorney, a diploma, of a socioeconomic status they assume to be higher 
than theirs. At the same time, they see someone whose outfit reminds them 
of the suit they wore for their cousins wedding, their job interview, or their 
high school graduation. The attorney greets the court, introduces himself 
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with his first and last name, no job title, no law firm, no higher education 
mentioned. The persuader then introduces his client, addresses the type of 
work done by his client’s company or the lifestyle his client lives that led 
up to whatever the situation may be that is being litigated.  
The persuader mentions the good his client brings to society, through 
the jobs it provides, the community service she does, or the family for 
whom he provides. The judge and jury both know something they may 
have not known before about the attorney’s client, have begun to identify 
with the client through an emotional connection with them or their work, 
and have potentially begun to perceive the attorney as slightly less of a 
diploma in a suit and a little more of a person who is defending the rights 
of someone they identify with. 
The persuader proceeds to the situation in question. He outlines what 
he will prove about the situation with the specific evidence he has gathered 
to provide. The judge and jury both note that the attorney is prepared, has 
apparently covered all of his bases, and seems passionate about his cause. 
They begin to see him as more credible, and appreciate that he has support 
for his claims and has prepared to provide such support to them. 
Aristotle himself noted that “advocates can use the introduction to 
make the audience receptive.”89 This, as illustrated above, can be achieved 
through body language, appearance, preparedness, demonstrated passion, 
and reasoning to name only a few. Notably, Cicero considered emotion a 
particularly effective tool in an advocate’s introduction of a case, positing 
“it is essential that [the exordium] should have the power of stirring the 
minds of the audience . . . [because it has] a very great effect in persuading 
and arousing emotion.”90 This supports the idea that setting an emotional 
tone in the case to aid in the audience’s identification with the advocate 
and his client can only serve to benefit the client throughout the remainder 
of the trial. On the contrary, for an attorney who fails to establish some 
connection from the outset, emotional or otherwise, between himself or his 
client and the judge and jury, making the jury and judge see a situation 
from his client’s perspective, or believe his client’s testimony or his own 
arguments, will likely prove far more difficult than it otherwise would 
have been, than if the attorney had initiated the connection in his opening 
statements. 
The “every-man’s” suit worn by the attorney and his demonstrated 
preparedness, as well as his avoidance of legalese in the above illustration 
 
 
 89. Frost, supra note 4, at 94. 












would serve to lessen the oft-preconceived distance between an attorney 
and a lay person of any other profession.
91
 This would thus promote 
identification between the attorney’s audience and himself and therefore 
increase his credibility in the eyes of the judge and jury. The attorney’s 
demonstrated passion for his client and his client’s cause, as well as his 
depiction of his client’s situation from the client’s perspective, based on 
his or her station in life and responsibilities, would hopefully also serve to 
stir the emotions of the audience. This would ideally increase the 
likelihood of not only identification via an emotional connection with the 
client but also reasoned deliberation between jury members that takes into 
account all facets of the client’s case including his or her particular 
situation.  
2. Direct Examination of a Witness 
The advocate calls his primary witness to the stand. He begins by 
asking very basic, foundational questions of the witness. The importance 
of these preliminary questions was effectively explained by Caldwell, 
Perrin, Gabriel & Gross, in that:  
From the jury’s perspective, it is just as important to know who is 
testifying as it is to understand what they say. Thus, every direct 
examination should begin with an attempt to personalize the witness 
and to reveal some of the witness’s background. This getting-to-
know-the-witness block should . . . develop a personal overview, 
including areas such as marital status, children, significant 
nonprofessional activities, and even the part of the country from 
which the witness comes. These personal facts give jurors a way to 
identify with the witness. Personalization creates rapport between 
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After these basic questions, the advocate moves on to establishing the 
witness’ connection with the incident in question and begins to get into the 
details of the witness’ knowledge by asking very pointed questions. He 
never disparages, or even nears disparaging his client’s opponent within 
his questions, as his goal is not to turn the jury against the other side but 
instead to bring the jury to the side of his client. The judge recognizes 
points which the advocate is hitting as the fulfillment of various elements 
of the case. While the jury may not make such a connection while the 
questioning is underway, the jury members are able to see the story of the 
incident in question from the witness’s perspective begin to unfold within 
the courtroom, illuminating what they likely understand to be important 
facts for consideration in their later deliberation.
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The answers the witness provides to the advocate’s questions seem 
natural. If, at any point, the witness draws a blank, the advocate utilizes his 
ability to refresh the witness’s recollection with prepared writings or other 
objects, at hand and easily accessible, complete with copies for opposing 
counsel when necessary pursuant to Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.
94
 The advocate’s line of questioning remains relevant, receives 
clear answers from the witness, and ultimately concludes with the jury and 
judge feeling more informed about the case and, if the advocate is 
fortunate, more inclined to believe and trust the advocate for remaining 
factual as opposed to displaying his biases and gracefully leading a helpful 
witness through a necessary step in the litigation.
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As Caldwell, Perrin, Gabriel, and Gross succinctly stated in their 
discussion of a legal advocate’s role in the direct examination of a witness: 
[Direct witness examination] is an attempt by the examiner and the 
witness to communicate a story or position to the fact-finder. And, 
 
 
 93. See id. at 474 (“One reason that personalization enhances the weight of the testimony is that 
it makes the witness more accessible to the jurors. Accessibility provides a sense of connection 
between jurors and the witness and more readily allows the jurors to view the testimony from the 
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 94. FED. R. EVID. 612. 
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Gabriel & Gross, supra note 86, at 445 (“Conventional wisdom holds that direct examinations are the 
one point in the trial when advocates should shift the spotlight from themselves to their witnesses. The 
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as is true of all communication, the success of the direct 
examination ultimately turns on whether the jury believes and likes 
the messenger. In the context of the direct examination, however, 
the messenger is not merely the witness who is testifying from the 
witness stand, but it is also the examiner who calls the witness and 




   As the examiner’s credibility as well as the witness’s is on the line in 
direct examination, it is crucial for the questioning attorney to have 
adequately prepared the witness for his line of questions. Louis Nizer, an 
esteemed trial attorney who published his recollections and observations 
from his time in the profession, observed:  
[A] lawyer who will put a witness on the stand without thorough 
preparation disserves his client, his profession, and the truth. He 
defeats justice, because such a witness will wander about 
unknowledgeably without the benefit of having had his memory 
refreshed by documents, the recollection of others corroborated by 
objective facts, and the truthful history painfully reconstructed by 
interviews, deposition, and written evidence gathered over a period 
of years, sometimes all over the world.
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Thus, if an advocate deviates from the form of the attorney in the 
illustration, by not being prepared for instances such as recollection 
problems or not having prepared the witness to answer the questions in 
their own words but still accurately, he is likely to lose credibility in the 
eyes of the judge and jury. He is therefore less likely to persuade his 
audience to see the case from his client’s perspective, ultimately making 
him and his client less likely to succeed in the litigation in question. On 
the other hand, with preparedness, candidness, and professionalism, both 
the witness and the attorney can depart from a witness examination having 
promoted their credibility, potentially provided the attorney with facts 
needed for his final logical appeal in his closing argument, and, with any 
luck (or skill), stirred the emotions of the audience to enable them to 
empathize with the situation of the advocate’s client.  
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3. Closing Arguments 
Instead of developing my own narrative in this situation, assume the 
same advocate detailed in the previous illustrations was Clarence Darrow 
in the case of The State of Illinois v. Nathan Leopold & Richard Loeb, in 
which he closed with the following, among other, remarks: 
I could say something about the death penalty that, for some 
mysterious reason, the state wants in this case. Why do they want 
it? To vindicate the law? Oh, no. The law can be vindicated without 
killing anyone else. It might shock the fine sensibilities of the state's 
counsel that this boy was put into a culvert and left after he was 
dead, but, your Honor, I can think of a scene that makes this pale 
into insignificance. I can think, and only think, your Honor, of 
taking two boys, one eighteen and the other nineteen, irresponsible, 
weak, diseased, penning them in a cell, checking off the days and 
the hours and the minutes, until they will be taken out and hanged. 
Wouldn't it be a glorious day for Chicago? Wouldn't it be a glorious 
triumph for the State's Attorney? Wouldn't it be a glorious triumph 
for justice in this land? Wouldn't it be a glorious illustration of 
Christianity and kindness and charity? I can picture them, wakened 
in the gray light of morning, furnished [with] a suit of clothes by the 
state, led to the scaffold, their feet tied, black caps drawn over their 
heads, stood on a trap door, the hangman pressing a spring, so that it 
gives way under them; I can see them fall through space—and—
stopped by the rope around their necks.
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As this passage demonstrates, the effective closing arguments of an 
advocate, arguably more than his arguments at any other stage of a trial, 
can be deemed “both an art and a science.”99 By this point in the trial, the 
advocate has hopefully established a positive reputation with the jury.
100
 
His closing arguments should thus not deviate from the efforts he has 
made throughout the previous steps of the trial in terms of maintaining his 
credibility through his preparedness, confidence,
101
 conservative and 
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respectable appearance, passion, and logical thinking.
102
 On the other 
hand, where the attorney may have previously shied away from outright 
appeals to emotion, “striking the proper emotional tone” is one of the 
several absolute goals an advocate should have in his closing arguments.
103
  
Emotional appeals in closing arguments, as an expected and permitted 
strategy at trial,
104
 should not replace or override but instead accompany 
necessary logical and legal arguments and the persuasiveness of the 
advocate’s credibility to form a complete picture of the case from the 
perspective of the advocate’s client.105 “Using logic to your best advantage 
is especially crucial to the closing argument, in which you must concisely 
present the intellectual frame of your case. Logic is the concrete and steel 
that holds up your position and shelters your client.”106  
Logical organization of the closing argument, in which the advocate 
explains the law, how the facts apply to the law, how contrary evidence 
does not detract from his client’s case, and what, precisely, the jury should 
do with this information, also likely enhances persuasion as a form of 
logical appeal.
107
 In this regard, the above excerpt from Darrow’s closing 
argument would be insufficient when standing alone, or at the very least, 
less persuasive than it would be if combined with a logic-based argument 
as to why the two young men should not be sentenced to death. Without 
any form of logical appeal in this case, or logical organization, the fate of 
the two lives in question might largely have been left up to whether a 
majority of the jurors believed the death penalty is appropriate in any case, 
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a decision the individual jurors had likely made before ever walking into 
the courtroom. 
IV. ACHIEVING SOCIETY’S GOALS WITH ARISTOTELIAN PERSUASION 
Assuming the goal of the legal system is the achievement of justice to 
the benefit of society,
108
 as well as the individuals involved in particular 
cases who are in the right,
109
 a question arises as to what role rhetoric 
plays in justice’s pursuit. Some have argued that justice is relational in that 
it “cannot be properly understood without taking account of individuals in 
a context that brings each into relationship with others.”110 This idea seems 
to comport with that of the necessity of emotional appeals and appeals to 
persuader credibility within an argument for the argument to be effective. 
The creation of positive emotions and the development of trust, liking, and 
some form, if only the foundation, of a relationship were all contemplated 
by Aristotle’s Rhetoric within his ethos and pathos.  
As Aristotle and his predecessors emphasized from the beginning, 
while the logic of an outcome also clearly plays a role in the determination 
of whether or not it is the most just of a series of options, the context in 
which the decision is made, as well as the means used to persuade a fact 
finder to make it, are all contingent upon the audience.
111
 The relationship 
formed between the audience and the persuader, based on emotional 
feelings the persuader manages to evoke (pathos) as well as liking of, 
trust, and confidence in him on the part of the audience (ethos), is an 
important avenue through which the persuasion is achieved.  
This is so because the next logical step to the analysis is the one in 
which the persuader, who understands and can relate to his audience, 
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ultimately persuades them utilizing his understanding of them and the way 
in which he can fashion his logical and rational arguments to appeal to 
them. In this sense, “[j]ustice can be understood only when those who 
claim something because it is ‘just’ are considered in relation to the others 
who may have concern or involvement with the issue that raises the 
question of whether something is just.”112 
While I am arguing that the three modes of proof are a positive force in 
the pursuit of justice when utilized together, it is important to note that 
other theorists have posited that, without the utilization of practical 
wisdom and craft alongside rhetoric, rhetoric, “when taken individually, 
provide[s] an incomplete and even dangerous account of legal 
reasoning.”113 This theory does not necessarily apply if the rhetoric 
referred to is limited to Aristotle’s rhetorical theories because, when taken 
to its logical end, Aristotle’s Rhetoric accounts for both practical wisdom, 
in that it “imbues craft with a moral dimension that it otherwise lacks”114 
by mandating the use of logic and rational arguments through logos, as 
well as the existence of a goodness in the persuader through ethos.
115
  
Furthermore, the dangers of non-specifically Aristotelian rhetoric, 
which has been defined by those concerned with its dangers as “a 
discipline for mobilizing the social passions for the sake of belief in a 
contestable truth whose validity can never be demonstrated with 
mathematical finality,”116 are minimized through the use of Aristotle’s 
rhetorical theory. Purely sophistic tendencies
117
 are limited in Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric in favor of a more philosophic art in which the audience is 
emphasized and logical, rational appeals are valued through the well-
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This intersection of Aristotle’s three modes of proof is what creates 
true, beneficial, and just persuasion in the courtroom. A trial attorney’s 
appeals to logic after carefully considering his position and thoroughly 
researching his topic can be considered by his audience, the judge and 
jury, in their deliberation of the case. Such appeals also lend themselves to 
the judge and jury members’ perception of the attorney’s credibility as a 
well-researched, well-prepared attorney, particularly one that can 
communicate his position with confidence, is in all cases more trustworthy 
than one who cannot and does not have full command of the relevant law. 
A trial attorney’s appeals to his credibility, alongside the inherent 
credibility that stems from his successful appeals to logic, come from his 
establishing a relationship, or common bond, with the judge and jury 
members. His body language, apparent attitude, use of identifiable and 
easily understandable language, and candidness all play a role in whether 
his audience likes, identifies with, trusts, and ultimately is more likely to 
be persuaded by him. Finally, an attorney’s appeals to his audience’s 
emotions stem from rousing his audience’s passions so that they invest 
themselves in the best possible outcome of a case, inspiring his audience 
to think creatively in order to rationally bridge gaps in a situation or 
analysis, and encouraging his audience’s sympathy enabling them to see a 
situation from all possible sides.  
“If the ultimate goal of the legal process is justice, then . . . we should 
desire the most sensitive understanding of the intersection of emotion and 
reason in order to maximize the breadth and depth of a [legal audience’s] 
imagination in conceiving justice.”119 This understanding and imagination 
can most effectively be maximized by providing all three modes of proof 
in concert to assist in an audience’s decision-making process. Only 
through the use of all three modes can one most effectively come to a 
logical, rational decision, which is fair and just based on the circumstances 
surrounding a case. This decision may ultimately be against the persuader, 
but Aristotle acknowledged that every argument was limited by the 





 119. Uffelman, supra note 70, at 1773. 
 120. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at Book I, Part I, Paragraph VII. This is still a widely accepted 
idea in communication theory. See Caldwell, Perrin, Gabriel & Gross, supra note 86 (“The objective 
of any effort to communicate depends heavily on context—the particular needs of the speaker, the 
make-up of the audience, and the specific circumstances present.”); see also Caldwell, Perrin & Frost, 
supra note 98, at 969 (“Many if not most cases turn not on the advocacy talents of the lawyers, but on 
the evidence and the law. This, of course, is as it should be. The party in the right prevails, justice 













Thus, while the client of a trial attorney may not come out with the 
victory he sought, “justice for all” will have been served by the ultimately 
correct disposition of the legal audience, the judge and jury. Furthermore, 
with the advocates of both sides, or each side in a multi-party case, 
utilizing Aristotelian Rhetoric, the posited dangers of ethos and pathos fall 
away as one side will not be at an emotional or credibility-related 
advantage. In such a case, where a balanced form of persuasion has been 
utilized by all sides, a just outcome based on the law will be the most 
likely to be achieved, provided the attorney of one side did not neglect his 
responsibilities and successfully collected all of the relevant facts in a case 
to present at trial. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While this Note hopefully has provided inspiration for legal theorists 
and educators, as well as practicing attorneys, to appreciate the value of 
Aristotle’s original Rhetoric and the Roman treatises that stemmed from it, 
it has merely scratched the surface of what specific tactics may be used to 
most effectively appeal to a legal audience using ethos, pathos, and logos. 
Because “the better we understand why we make the decisions we make, 
the more transparency the law will have,” I believe the step that follows 
this Note is one in which quantitative studies are conducted to ensure the 
three modes can and do intersect peacefully in order to result in just 
outcomes.
121
 Within these studies, the potential for emotional and ethical 
manipulation should be further explored, and safeguards against unjust 
manipulation, if in fact it is possible in the courtroom, can be further 
developed. 
Alongside this research-oriented call to action, I hope this Note serves 
to communicate the value that Aristotle’s rhetorical theories and the 
treatises they inspired could have if included in the curricula of the 
institutions charged with training future attorneys.
122
 “Indeed, trial lawyers 
have much to learn about advocacy in general and direct examination in 
particular from contemporary communication and psychological research 
and, rather than ignore those disciplines, lawyers should look to them for 
instruction and guidance”123 as “despite the proliferation of trial advocacy 
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clinics and the offerings in law schools, much of what is actually taught is 
still unduly colored by the anecdotal experiences of the teachers.”124 
Instead of relying primarily on the singular perspective of a professor in 
practical skills law classes, legal education institutions should rely on 
curricula centered on legitimate communication, political, psychological, 
and sociological theories, and what better theory to begin the revolution 
than the one that started them all, and has furthermore retained legitimacy 
throughout the history of persuasion theory? 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Classical, Aristotelian rhetoric, based on the above analysis, is still 
viable and would be useful if utilized by advocates in a courtroom setting. 
Its dismissal in favor of solely logic-based forms of argument is not ideal 
as such dismissal removes the human element from the courtroom.
125
 Such 
a human element is clearly valued in the judicial system. Proof of this lies 
in the fact that one of the system’s foundations, the use of a jury of one’s 
peers, exists to insert a human element where it otherwise may have been 
replaced by logic standing alone.
126
 The value that such an element can 
bring to the legal environment was expressed with great clarity by Minow 
and Spelman, in that:  
Context . . . represents the acknowledgement of the situatedness of 
human beings who know, argue, justify, and judge. Rather than a 
weakness or a departure from the ideal of distance and 
impersonality, acknowledging the human situation and the location 
of a problem in the midst of communities of actual people with 
views about it is a precondition of honesty in human judgements. 
Ultimately, the attention to the varieties of contexts for judgement 
helps to focus on human intelligence, the thinking, creating, 
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responding parts of human beings, drawn out by the task of making 
decisions about how to live and treat others.
127
 
Logos, ethos, and pathos, a persuader’s logical, credibility-related, and 
emotional appeals, when used in concert, create a whole argument.
128
 This 
argument is one which takes into account the human element as well as the 
rational and logical needs of the law in its pursuit of justice. Classical 
Aristotelian rhetoric, thus, must not be dismissed by the advocate hoping 
to most effectively represent his client. Nor should it be dismissed by the 
legal community as form over substance.
129
 As I have demonstrated, the 
end result of an attorney utilizing Aristotle’s three modes together is the 
fairest result possible in a given situation, so substance is not sacrificed, 
and effective form is still maintained. 
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